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THE REAL INCOME OF UGAMDA - 1954-1952 
Official estinates of the Gross Domestic Product of Uganda have 
"been available since 1960, when the Government Statistician published 
a series covering the years 1954-59. These calculations were in 
terms of current prices, a fact which (potentially, at any rate) im-
paired their usefulness for purposes of economic analysis and planning. 
Changes in the value of the national income are an amalgam of price 
and quantity changes; to the extent that we wish to use the national 
accounts as indicators of changes in aggregate welfare (end indeed 
for a number of other purposes), it is the quantity changes we are 
interested in, net of price effect. Changes in prices ma;/ be presumed 
to affect the distribution of national income (between consumption and 
investment, between wages and other incomes) rather than its overall 
magnitude. The exception to this is when we attempt to measure 
changes in resources available rather than in resources p_roduce_d, when 
it is not the volume of~ export's that concerns us but their capacity 
to buy imports. 
The recent publication of official estimates of the real growth 
of the economy of Uganda between 1954 ~nd 1962:' therefore certainly 
fills a gap. It provides annual estimates, at 1960 prices not only 
for G„D.?, overall but also for its main components, by sector, in-
dustry and commodity. Separate "orice indices are used for each major 
commodity or commodity-group, the values deflated being factor incomes 
for all sectors and industries, except African agriculture (cash and 
subsistence) where the approach is partially made from the production 
side. Altogether, this is a most ambitious undertaking, representing 
the results of months of painstaking and ingenious work. How ambitious, 
one only realises when reading its nearest Kenya, equivalent (Dev. Plan 
' 64- '70, eh, 3) where the authors, seeking a measure of 'real' na-
tional income, contented themselves bjr deflating current the value of 
G,D.P. by the Nairobi (Euronean) cost of Living Index, and left it at 
that. 
Was it worth'it? The question needs asking, for the time of 
economic statisticians is one of the scarcest commodities in Uganda 
and, unless one is a believer in the labour-theory of value, . 
admiration., for the 'input' should not obscure the need for a cri-
tical assessment of the 'output'. The relevant questions seem to be; 
do the price-adjusted figures differ significantly from the current 
values hitherto available? and; does the bringing to light of these 
differences significantly alter or add to our understanding of the 
workings of the Uganda Economy? (To these one should add the question, 
how reliable are the figures? Can we believe them? important though 
It is, I do not intend to discuss it here in detail. Some of the 
assumptions are clearly chancy; it is assumed for instance, that in 
services, Government and construction, accounting for one sixth of 
monetary G.D.P., output of labour is proportional to employment; an 
assumption that clearly need not be true. Yet the conceptual dif-
ficulties of assuming anything else are such that it is hard to 
blame anyone for making this convenient and probably not too mis-
leading assumption. One has, after all, no strong reasons to believe 
that the productivity of teachers or civil servants has been under-
going remarkable transformation, though changes in the "grade-mix" of 
these groups should ideally be taken into account, when time and 
statistical resou„r-ces permit. ) 
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At first glance, the difference "between the adjusted, 
and unadjusted figures of G.D.P. does not seen large enough 
to justify the work that has gone into its calculation. 
Whereas G,D„P. at current prices rose "by 21 J, the corresponding 
change in the 'real figure is 26.41'. Thus the overall 
"G.D.P.; Price Index" shows a fall of 4'i, impljring that 'real* 
output per annum rose noy 3.0't p. a. and not by 2.4,o as would 
otherwise appear. 
One "begins to prick up one's ears, however, when the 
comparison is restricted to monetary GDP. This, while it 
rose onljr 15"i over the period at current prices, shows a 
rise of 26% when adjusted for price-changes, and the re-
sultant difference between the annual growth rates (1.8' and 
3.0J) is certainly worth noting. 
If the unwary reader thought that the 4 ' 'infl^tor' 
could be applied indiscriminately to all sectors of the 
economy, this study has a surprise in store for him. 
Separate price-indices have been calculated for each of 
the 14 producing sectors of the economy (with sub-indices for 
major sub-sectors). Five of these show price falls, rang-
ing from - 1 to - 25 J, while 9 show a price rise, ranging 
from l,o to 221 '! Thus, while the current value estimates 
give a fairly accurate picture of the magnit ~de of the over-
all change in G.P P. they cle-.rljr greatly distort changes 
in its sectoral conr-osition Broadly speaking, it may be 
said that the sectors in which prices fell or increased 
least are those producing goods,, while the major price rises 
took "lace in the service sVc'tor. (Op . cit , p. 16, Table 5, ) 
while this overall picture is not realljr surprising and con-
forms to international experience (it is easier to increase 
productivity in making goods than in producing service's, 
and easier in the private sector - Ydiich produces most goods -
than in Government'- which produces most services), it has 
serious implications, to which we shall return later. 
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It will be seen from the table above that agriculture decreased its 
share in GDP by 10$ at current prices, but by only 2 a t constant prices. 
Thus, agricultural output grew slightly slower than GDP as a whole, while-
agricultural prices fell substantially. As a result of these factors, 
agricultural incomes (including subistence) now form a little over half of 
total domestic incomes, compared to nearly two thirds in 1954. 
Historical experience leads us to expect that the share of agricul-
ture in GDP declines as per capita incomes grow, as demand for agricultural 
products tends to be inelastic with respect to changes in per capita income. 
Indeed, one would expect that, if development proceeds at a satisfactory 
rate, over the next generation the share of agriculture in G.D.P. will drop 
to about a quarter. Can we, however, assume that the decline shown in the 
table above is an example of such a historical trend? 
A 1 satisfactory' transfer of enphasis from agriculture to other 
producing sectors would generally imply that:-
(i) population is being fed at least as well as before,, i.e. the. 
real growth of agricultural production (excl. exports) is at 
least as fast as the overall rate of growth.of population, and 
- • . _ that the growth of food sales to urban areas is keeping pace 
with urban population growth; 
(ii) this increase in production is being achieved with, a diminishing 
input of real resources, certainly in relative terms, and pro-
bably even in absolute terms. I.e. one would expect agricul-
tural population to be growing slower than the total adult 
population, and possibly even falling. We would expect the area 
of cultivated land to be growing slower than output (indicative 
of rising output per acrej, but to be growing faster (or falling 
slower) than the labour force (indicating rising output per 
man-acre) 
(iii) Thus there would be an annual transfer of real resources from 
agriculture to other activities, vi/hile the growth of agricultural 
output would be maintained at a rate .at least equal to the rate 
of growth of population. This is absolutely essential,•if the 
growing number of non-food producing consumers is to be adequately 
fed. If this does not happen, the momentum of industrialisation 
can only be maintained by increasing food imports, the opportunity 
cost of which is imports of capital equipment. 
On first examination it would appear that the performance of Uganda 
agriculture was, on these counts, highly unsatisfactory during the period under 
study. Real output is estimated to have grown at a rate of 2.4$ per annum, or 
less than the rate of population growth, which is "estimated at may be 
higher, and is certainly rising. During this period, net imports of food from 
outside East Africa grew at an annual rate of over 5$. Before committing our-
selves to this view of the performance of agriculture, let us take a closer 
look at the 'real' behaviour of the internal components of agricultural output. 
TABLE II 
1954-62 Percentage Real Change: Sub-sector as % of 
' 8-year Per annum ' 54 output ' " 
Overall growth of Agric. 21.2 2. 4- 100.0 
African Enterprises 11.3 1. 3 51.3 
of. -which: Cotton ^ -50.1 -5.2 23.1 
Coffee 277.5 18.0 4.4 
Prod.Un. Suipl. - 1.5 -0.2 . •0.9 
Misc. Exports -48.1 -5.0 2.7 
Sales to rural empl 3.6 -0,4 3.1 
Sales urban Afr, 25.7 2.9 0.7 
Sales to non-Afr. '42.4 4.5 1.7 
Rwanda porters nil nil 0.1 
Livestock 84.9* 8.0 5.5 
Milk 48.7 ' 5.1 • 1.8 
Beer • 20.3 2.3 7.8 
Less: Inputs from other ind. : 75.7 7.3 '-0,5 
Corporate & Non-Afr. Agric. 79.7 7. 6 3.9 
Agr. Prod, by Publ. Sector 36,8 4. .0 0.7 
Subsistence Agriculture 26.8 3. 0 44.1 
1962 was an exceptionally bad year for cotton, but average 55-61 production 
was still way below the 1954 level. 
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Examination of the growth-rates of the main sub-sectors changes our picture 
somewhat. W; have seen that estate production, public sector output and the subsist-
ence sector all grew at a rate exceeding that of population, and that the 
"culprit" (if there was one) was the sub-sector "African Enterprises", which 
grew at a rate of.only 1.3$ per annum. This unsatisfactory figure was, however, 
due almost entirely to the disastrous 1962 cotton crop. If for the actual. 
1962-output we substitute the 1955-61 average, the growth-rate for agriculture 
as a whole and also for the agricultural output of "African Enterprises" becomes 
3.4$> per annum. 
While this is clearly more satisfactory, it is still far from splendid. 
Firstly, an annual rate of growth of 3,4$ still only barely exceeds the rate of 
population growth. Secondly, (counting cotton at the 55-61 average), 70$ of the 
total increase in production was due to coffee. Yet, the virtual quadrupling of 
coffee production only increased actual export receipts by 20$ (or 19$ if we 
count power to command imports). It is not obvious that an investment vvhich 
quadruples output but increases receipts by a fifth, is necessarily a good one. 
Thirdly,if we concentrate our attention on food production for the domestic 
markets, the apparently -satisfactory growth-rates melt in our hands. They are 
assumed rather than proven: sales to rural and urban Africans and to urban non-
Africans were calculated on the assumption of constant food-consumption per 
capita by these groups!1 Thus the growth rates tell us no more than the official 
estimate of the growth of the number of these people. This is no criticism of 
those who prepared this most valuable publication, but an illustration of the 
limits, to. the uses to which it 'may legitimately be put. It would, however, be 
useful if, in future publications, some of the more important limitations were 
specifically pointed out in -the introduction. 
. No "other producing sector is analysed in the same sort of detail as 
agriculture, for obvious reasons. It is, however, most instructive, to observe 
the - often striking - differences when the 14 producing sectors are ranked, 
first in order of 'real* growth-rates and then in order of 'money' growth-rates. 
TABLE III. 
Uganda G.D.P. - Real and Money Growth Rates Compared 
Sector Real Growth Money' Growth Rank Rank 
per annum per annum Real Growth Money Growth 
Electricity 16.4 16.2 1 1 
Mining 14.5 14.9 2 2 
Commerce 6.1 2.3 3 10 
Transport & Comm. 5.5 5.7 4 8 
Misc. Manufact. .5.2 3.3 5 9 
Rents 4.5 12.6 6 3 
Misc. Serv.•(Edn, health) 3.8 10.3 7 5 
Forestry, fishing,hunting 3.6 10.1 8 6 
GROSS- JJUAiJiSTlU PRODUCT 3.0 2.4 _ 
Agriculture 2.4 . 0.2 - 9 11 
Central Govt. 2.3 . 9.5 10 7' 
Cotton-gin.coffee-cur'g. 
sugar-manufacturing 1.2 -0.8 11 13 
Ivknuf. of food production-2.4 -1.8 12 14 
Afr. Local Govt. -2.6 ' 12.0 13 4 
Construction -3.3 -0.2 14 12 
(A money rate of growth of more than 2.4$ irrplies that incomes derived from a 
particular sector have increased their share of Gross Domestic Product and vice 
versa. If the money rate of .growth exceeds the real rate, a rise in prices is 
suggested, if the reverse is -the case, a fall. Very roughly speaking,.a price-
rise in. a sector, which is greater than that for G.D.P. as a whole, suggests 
that goods produced by that sector have become- more eScpensive relative to G.D.P. 
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as a whole. As the price-index for G.D.P. as a whole fell by 4$ over the period, 
any price rise, and any price fall of less than 4$ carries this implication. 
This appears to have happened in African Local Govt. (4-221$), Rents (4"81$) 
C. Govt. "(4r71$) , Forestry Fishing & Hunting (+62$), Misc. Services /mainly 
education & health/ (+-62$j, Construction (+39$) . Manufacture of Food Products 
(f~7$), Mining & Quarrying (+3$), Transport & Communications (+1$) and Electricity 
(-1$). The products of agriculture, cotton ginning etc., misc. manufacturing & 
commerce have become 'cheaper'. These calculations are too rough to prove that 
any particular group has become better or worse off, unless its consumption 
pattern exactly corresponds to the production-pattern of GDP. They do, however, 
suggest very strongly that there has been a strong shift in the 'internal terms 
of trade' against the agricultural population and in favour of the urban wage-
and salary-earning minority. To be much more specific would require budget-
studies of a kind which we neither have nor are likely to have in the near 
future.) 
Table II identifies the 'leading' and 'lagging' sectors of the economy. It will 
be noticed that only electricity (covering both generation and construction), 
mining, commerce, transport and miscellaneous manufacturing achieved 'real' 
growth-rates which could be characterised as really satisfactory. Wo doubt, the 
reader will be surprised, as the writer was, at the comparatively slow (even 
negative) growth-rates shown by the public sector. However, the purpose of the 
present discussion is not to explain the factors making for fast or slow 'real' 
rates of growth, but to focus attention on the striking disparities between 'raal1 
and 'money' growth-rates which the table reveals/and to explore some of their 
possible implications. It should be clearly noted that, in the discussion which 
follows, we are provisionally accepting the Government Statistician's own defini-
tions and calculations of real product in the services sector. In the last 
section of the paper, reasons will be advanced to show that the definitions, and 
hence the calculations based on them, are open to serious doubt. 
Central and Local Government and Miscellaneous Services (mainly Health and 
Education) may be roughly described as 'Publicly Provided Services', though both 
education and health contain a significant private element. These sectors 
increased their share of 'current value' G.D.P. by nearly 80$ (from 6.7$ to 11.9$ 
of G.D.P.), while their share of 'real' G.D.P. actually fell by 4$ (from 11.7$ 
to 11,2$ of 'real' G.D.P.), implying that Ugandans as a whole were paying a much 
larger share of their incomes for what was not very much more service. The 
implied 'unit cost* (whatever this is taken to mean) of Central Government 
service rose by 71$, that of local government by 221$ (while 'output' actually 
fell!), while the cost of Miscellaneous Services rose 62$. Altogether, it would 
appear that Publicly Provided Services are costing Uganda 120$ more moehey for 
20$ more services, or that the average price level in this sector rose by 81$ 
(or 85$ in relation to G.D.P. as a whole) between 1954 and 1962. Admittedly, 
these sectors are the heaviest users of Uganda's very scarce supply of 'high level 
manpower' - Hunter's Survey suggests that in 1962 the 'service sector' as 
defined above used three quarters of the country's graduates or graduate -
equivalents. Demand - both public and private - for the products of these 
services has been one of the phenomena of the 'revolution of rising expectations.' 
It is understandable, therefore, that earnings per head in these sectors should 
have risen faster than the rate of growth of G.D.P. whether measured at current 
or at constant prices. 
/ The Spearman Rank Correlation coefficient between the two series is only 0.56. 
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TAB HE IV 
Growth of G.D.P. and Per Capita Earnings, 1955-62 
Sector 
' 1955-62 
$ Growth 
All Wages as $ 
of value added, 1958 
1.; Monetary G.D.P. 
African Earnings/Capita in: 
2. Total Labour Force 
2(a) Government(Admin. and Lisc.) 
2(b) African Local Government 
2(c) Education & Medical 
2(d) Miscellaneous. Services 
5. (= 2(a) - d) All Services 
4.9 
104. 5 
93.6 
150.2 
95.7 
64.9 
117.1 
23.3 
.(Source: Enumeration of Employees, Statistical Abstract, 'Real Product' 
qp.•cit.) 
As the table above shows, African per capita earnings ^  doubled over the 
period 1955-62 (no.1954 earning figures are available), while monetary G.D.P, 
increased by. only 3?o (and 'real' G.D.F. by only 16$). Thus labour in all'sectors 
became, more expensive relative to a 'unit of G.D.P.' (though it is conceivable 
that this was partially offset by increased productivity). The reason why the 
products of the 'service industries' appear to have become more expensive in 
relation to G.D.P. as a "whole, is only partly explained by the fact that per 
capita earnings in these sectors rose faster than in the rest of the economy 
(the rise in services being only 117$ compared to 105$ for all earnings). It id 
rather because wages in these sectors constitute two thirds of value added, 
compared to less than a quarter for the monetary economy as a whole. 
One must presume (though information is too scanty to prove it) that per 
capita earnings in the higher .skill-groups rose as fast as other earnings in 
those sectors, and in fact constituted a major part of the increase in -wage-bills 
in the sectors under discussion. 'This can, of course, be attributed to the grow-
ing scarcity of skilled personnel, relative to other labour and to other factors 
of production. // Yet, one must seriously doubt whether price-(and by implica-
tion, salary-) increases of this order of magnitude have served any useful 
economic purpose. The short-run supply of these factors is inelastic with 
respect of changes in their price, and the long-run supply is, in any case, 
being expanded as fast as possible. The allocation problem created by the short-
run excess demand'had to be solved, but it could, perhaps, have been tackled to 
better advantage by some form of demand-rationing, rather than by allowing supply-
prices to rise to this extent. It cannot, after all, be argued that the remun-
eration of 'professionals' in relation to other occupational groups was so low 
in 1954 that there was no financial incentive to enrol for courses in higher 
education. 
Be that as it.may, had this happened in any other sector, there would have 
been no- lack of volunteers to argue that here was a prima facie case of a. 
'monopolist' pushing up prices by restricting output, or, at the very least, that 
someone was earning monopoly profits (or 'rent') as a result of unavoidable 
scarcity. Yet, it would appear, a. Government .is in an even stronger position 
than the hypothetical monopolist. The monopolist can either fix his price or 
his quantity, but no both.- A Government is in a position to determine indepen-
dently first price (through taxation) and then quantity (through its pattern 
of expenditure). Had it been the price of sugar or fountain-pens that was being 
determined in this fashion,. It wo.uld soon have been undercut by imported or 
domestic substitutes. But no one who thinks that education or the civil service 
are atrociously expensive, has the alternative of opting out of paying his taxies, 
and 'buying his government' elsewhere (or doing without one). Indeed, he hasn't 
^ No information is available for non-African earnings prior to 1958. Though 
58-62 information suggests that African per cap. earnings have been rising 
half as fast again as all earnings per cap. taken together, this does not 
affect the picture given above significantly. 
// Other wage-incomes also rose at several times the rate of growth of G.D.P. 
without even the justification of scarcity, as employment overall was 
stagnant or falling. 



